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Abstract 
 
 
This paper studies the mental distress caused by bereavement.  The largest 
emotional losses are from the death of a spouse; the second-worst in severity 
are the losses from the death of a child; the third-worst is the death of a 
parent.  The paper explores how happiness regression equations might be 
used in tort cases to calculate compensatory damages for emotional harm 
and pain-and-suffering.  We examine alternative well-being variables, 
discuss adaptation, consider the possibility that bereavement affects 
someone’s marginal utility of income, and suggest a procedure for 
correcting for the endogeneity of income.  Although the paper’s contribution 
is methodological, and further research is needed, some illustrative 
compensation amounts are discussed.  
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Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of Compensatory Damages 
 
Andrew J Oswald 
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the impact upon a person’s happiness of the death of a loved one -- 
especially a child, a spouse1, or a parent.  It uses longitudinal data on randomly 
sampled individuals.  Although our results may be applicable in other ways in social 
science, we shall have in mind, for concreteness, one particular application.  Thinking 
of a court setting the size of damages for emotional loss, we shall try to suggest ways 
to assign a financial value to the unhappiness caused by another’s death. 2 
 
Our methods will not draw upon answers to complex questions about how intensely 
the person values (or valued) that loved one.  Although it may go without saying, we 
wish to emphasise from the start that this kind of inquiry is a difficult and morally 
sensitive3 one, and that -- perhaps hidden to lay readers by the later algebra and 
econometrics -- the results will rely on a simple form of averaging across different 
people.  Whatever its methodological contribution, this paper will be some way from 
the last word on the topic.  
 
A tort occurs where there is a breach of a duty fixed by civil law.  If a tort is 
committed, the law allows a victim to claim compensation.  The underlying principle 
is one of restitutio in integrum.  The claimant should be restored, by the payment of 
compensatory damages, to their original position.   
 
Many of the valuable things in life -- love, friendship, health -- come without dollar 
price-tags attached.  If their financial value is to be judged, therefore, some method 
has to be found for assigning pecuniary amounts in situations that do not appear to 
have any intrinsically financial aspect.  In most countries, it is judges who set 
                                                 
1 We shall use the terms ‘spouse’ and ‘partner’ largely interchangeably.  The latter includes those who are 
unmarried but co-habit.    
2 Terminology varies across countries.  We shall not focus upon the distinction between the term ‘hedonic 
damages’ and the wording ‘pain-and-suffering awards’.  For simplicity we shall treat these as similar; the paper is 
about the general problem, namely, that of how to set a level of financial compensation for emotional loss.  Within 
the United States, only a small number of states officially recognize the concept of hedonic damages.   
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damages, and they do so by using rules of thumb with conceptual foundations that are 
ad hoc (see, for example, pages 345-347 of Elliott and Quinn, 2005).  From an 
economist’s perspective, the law literature here can be difficult to understand.  Elliott 
and Quinn (2005), for example, make the (to an economist confusing) statement: “it is 
not … easy to calculate the value of a lost limb, or permanent loss of general good 
health, and even if it were, money can never really compensate for such losses.” 
[p.340]. Moreover, financial settlements can in practice be so small that their 
intellectual basis is perplexing.  In West and Son versus Shephard (1964) in the 
United Kingdom, the claimant was a married woman who was 41 when severely 
injured.  She was left paralysed in all limbs and unable to speak.  A lump-sum award 
of £17,500 for loss of amenity (over and above a settlement for harm to her earnings) 
was upheld by the House of Lords.  In today’s terms, that is about 5% of the lifetime 
income for a successful professional white-collar worker.  It seems implausible that 
many people would contentedly accept complete paralysis in return for a tiny pay rise.  
 
Damages for the death of loved ones are generically low in some nations.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provides a lump sum currently set at 
£10,000 damages for bereavement (that is, approximately $20,000 US dollars).  This 
one-off payment “is designed to provide some compensation for the non-pecuniary 
losses associated with bereavement.  It is only available to the husband or wife of the 
deceased, or, if the deceased was unmarried and a minor, to the parents.  It does not 
give children a claim for the death of a parent.”   Elliott and Quinn, 2005 [p.350].   
 
A UK judge and law professor sent us the following view: 
 
The area you are concerned with is hugely problematic for English lawyers - the US approach has been 
much more forceful on this kind of front.  
 
Expressions such as "diminution of quality of life" for a tort victim have been found for some time, but 
the notion of "loss of pleasure" of life is not the normal way in which lawyers in the English courts tend 
to talk about such heads of loss. 
  
Nevertheless, we do struggle with similar issues - particularly in jurisdictions such as that in which I sit 
(sex, race, disability, etc. discrimination claims) when it comes to awarding sums under the head of 
"injury to feelings". The appellate level courts have been consistent in stressing that this is "not a 
scientific exercise", and have tended to indicated broad "bands" within which awards should normally 
be made. Awards of a trivial or "tokenistic" nature are strongly discouraged - and the usual framework 
would consist of three bands (injury to be taken seriously, but not having that great an impact; mid-
range injury to feelings, which would be the case where the particular impact on the individual is 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Tetlock (2003) discusses conditions under which human beings are willing to countenance taboo trade-offs.    
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shown to have been quite dramatic; and the top end, which is reserved for "outrageous" cases and is 
only rarely available to the judge).  
Private communication dated May 2 
2007, anonymous.  
  
So what should courts do?  Here we explore the empirical foundations of losses from 
bereavement, and, by using happiness regression equations, suggest methods for 
valuation.4  The analysis could be viewed as an empirical analogue of Posner’s (2001) 
call for a better understanding of the emotions and legal practice (earlier writing 
includes Kahan and Nussbaum 1996). 5  Posner and Sunstein (2005) discuss related 
ideas: the authors point out that in the US there are logical inconsistencies in how 
lives are valued in regulatory policy compared to in tort law; they note that the 
conventional wisdom in the United States legal profession is that damages for 
wrongful death can be arbitrary; and they argue that in some cases courts appear to 
misunderstand the nature of hedonic loss. 
 
The paper’s aim is to sketch an alternative to willingness-to-pay (WTP) methods in 
the setting of emotional damages.  This is not because we think WTP necessarily 
lacks validity, although we do believe that answering questions, even probabilistically 
worded, like “what number of dollars would compensate you for the death of your 
daughter?”, is likely to be hard for everyone, and morally offensive to many.    
 
Our purpose is to see what numbers come out of an alternative method.  In actual 
courtroom settings, it seems possible that a complementary mixture of methods might 
one day be used.   
 
Later analysis uses regression equations in which a measure of subjective well-being 
is the dependent variable.  Intuitively, our method can trace out a form of indifference 
curve between income and any kind of life event (such as bereavement).  This is 
achieved, put loosely, by measuring how many happiness points are gained on 
                                                 
4 There is a large medical and psychiatric literature on the impact of bereavement on people.  We shall not attempt 
to summarize that research field, but a readable introduction can be found in Middleton et al (1997), and an 
important paper in Lehman et al (1993). 
 
5 Peter Hammond has pointed out to us that our approach is reminiscent of Robert Nozick's idea that interpersonal 
comparisons could be used to equate a criminal's incremental disutility brought about by the punishment with the 
victim's disutility due to the crime. 
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average by a higher income of X thousand dollars, and how many happiness points 
are lost by the death of a loved one, and then calculating the ratio of the two.  Doing 
so provides a statistical measure of the marginal rate of substitution between the 
pleasure of money and the pain from the death of a loved one. 
 
For pedagogical simplicity, we shall often treat the well-being data as though they 
were cardinal.  This is formally unattractive, and can be altered without affecting the 
paper’s main points, but it has the advantage that it allows regression-equation 
coefficients to be read off in a way that is easily interpreted.  Moreover, there has 
been much recent econometric work, at the borders between psychology, 
epidemiology and economics, on happiness and well-being, where it has been found 
that the precise kinds of econometric estimators do not affect the key findings.  Here 
we follow methods explained in sources such as Argyle (2001), Clark and Oswald 
(2002), Diener et al (1999), Di Tella et al (2001, 2003), Frey and Stutzer (2002), 
Oswald (1997), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), and Van Praag and 
Baarsma (2005).  Redoing our later equations using ordered logit estimators, for 
example, leaves the substance unchanged.   
 
A central issue in the paper will be that of how much, if any, extra happiness is 
produced by a greater level of income.  There has been a long debate on this topic.  It 
is still not settled.  Currently the consensus position is probably that there is a 
statistically significant but small positive effect.  In other words, money buys some 
extra happiness, but not a large amount.  Methodological approaches vary: Kahneman 
et al (2006) and Gardner and Oswald (2007) provide recent evidence from different 
ends of the spectrum.  Clark et al (2006) surveys the literature.  Later in the paper we 
attempt to contribute to ideas on how to instrument an income variable. 
 
What should we believe about the extent of hedonic adaptation, that is, the idea that 
human beings habituate to tragedy?  Bagenstos and Schlanger (2006) make an 
argument that the existence of such adaptation largely nullifies the case for 
compensatory damages.  The concept of adaptation has a long history, valuably 
summarized in Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) and Fujita and Diener (2005), and 
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discussed conceptually in Menzel et al (2002), Rayo and Becker (2007), Ubel et al 
(2005), and Dolan and Kahneman (2007).  There is good evidence for habituation in 
utility levels: for example, Lucas et al (2003).  In its most extreme form this is known 
as set-point theory: whatever life throws at them people return to an original well-
being point. 6 Brickman et al (1978) is sometimes interpreted as support for complete 
adaptation, although Easterlin et al (2006) and our own longitudinal work sheds doubt 
on the claim that heavily disabled people go back fully to their original level of well-
being (Oswald and Powdthavee 2004). 
 
The paper will not say a great deal about differences between ex ante and ex post.  
Our methods seem to apply even in a world where people are poor at affective 
forecasting (Gilbert et al 1998, Hsee and Hastie 2006).  Nor shall we draw upon other 
non-subjective measures of well-being and distress such as suicide rates (for example 
as Stevenson and Wolfers 2006 do); there may be some, presumably small, bias in our 
results if suicide rates are immediately higher among bereaved relatives.  Although 
our methods could also be applied to the field of employment law -- Huang and Moss 
2006 contains an interesting discussion of related issues -- that avenue will not be 
pursued here.  
 
2. Concepts 
 
The idea of compensatory damages for emotional harm seems a natural one.  Assume 
that a person’s utility (or ‘happiness’) is negatively affected by the death of a loved 
one.  A person’s utility is an increasing function of their earned income, y, plus any 
non-labor income, i.  There is some choice behaviour, a, that is taken optimally by the 
individual.  Costs of action are a function c = c(a).   
                                                 
6 Set-point theory is not usually expressed formally, but might be thought about in the following way. Assume 
that, where t is continuous time, utility u is described by a differential equation du/dt = a dx/dt + b – cu, in which x 
is some variable that influences well-being and a,b,c are non-negative parameters.  This equation has the solution 
 
∫ +−= t Kdcutaxtu
0
)()()( ττ  
 
where K is a constant determined partly by the size of the b parameter.  The integral term in this equation means 
that the longer utility has been above its set point the lower must current utility be.  In the short-term, a positive 
shock to x raises u.  Then utility erodes back down to the long-run steady state, which is determined solely by 
parameters b and c.  In steady-state equilibrium, x does not affect long-run utility, u* = b/c.  There is complete 
adaptation. 
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Write the direct utility function and maximization problem, assuming a separable 
form, as: 
 
Maximize u = u (a, y + i) – c(a) – D 
 
and the indirect utility function then as 
 
v = v(y + i) – D = max u  
 
where the action, a, is set optimally at the argmax a* of u, and D stands for the 
emotional cost of a death. 
 
In a tort case, in which some party has been negligent, there may exist a sum of 
money, s, that satisfies for the victim the restitutio in integrum requirement that 
 
v(y + i + s) – D = v(y + i). 
 
utility after the death and the compensation =  utility without the death occurring  
 
Given monotonicity and concavity of the utility function, the appropriate s is an 
increasing, convex function of D.   
 
The financial sum s can be thought of as redressing the disutility consequences of D, 
namely, as the correct amount of emotional damages in a tort case in which the aim is 
to return the bereaved victim to the original utility level.  In the harsh language of 
microeconomic theory, a person receiving s is indifferent between whether their loved 
one lived or died.  This has, even to us, an inhuman sound7 to it; perhaps future work 
will have to get to the bottom of why, but this paper will not.  The remainder of the 
paper is concerned with methods that attempt to assess the appropriate value of s. 
 
3. Empirics 
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Empirically, a key difficulty is that of deciding the extent of the emotional hurt caused 
to a person by the death of a loved one.  Ideally a statistical inquiry has to have a 
number of features: 
(i) individuals in a sample must be followed over a reasonably long period, so 
that information on them is available before bereavement and afterwards; 
(ii) the bad life event must be exogenous; 
(iii) there needs to be a control group of individuals unaffected by the event; 
(iv) the sample should be reasonably representative of the adult population; 
(v) a set of control variables, including income, should be available in the data 
set, so that confounding influences can be differenced out.  
To our knowledge, no econometric study of this type on the emotional losses of 
various kinds of death of loved ones has been published (some, including Clark et al 
2004 and Riis et al 2005, and the seminal panel-data paper on unemployment by 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998, look at other life events, including death of a 
spouse, and do satisfy a number of these requirements).  Powdthavee (2005a,b; 2007) 
studies crime, joblessness, and friendships.  Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2002) 
and Groot et al (2004) explore the negative well-being effect of various diseases.  
Oswald and Powdthavee (2004) examine happiness levels after disability.    
 
The source used in the paper is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  This is a 
nationally representative sample of households, which contains over 10,000 adult 
individuals, conducted between September and Christmas of each year from 1991 (see 
Taylor et al, 2002).  Respondents are interviewed in successive waves; households 
who move to a new residence are interviewed at their new location; if an individual 
splits off from the original household, the adult members of their new household are 
also interviewed.  Children are interviewed once they reach 11 years old (though we 
later drop the children from our sample).  Since its inception, BHPS has remained 
representative of Britain’s population. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Cooter (2003) refers to our problem as the search for a ‘repugnant formula’ and argues that in some legal settings 
there are things -- such as dollars and the life of a child -- that are incommensurable: “the loss of a child is an 
extreme example of incompensable losses” p.1098.   
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This paper draws upon individual-level data from eight of the years: Waves 2-5, 
Wave 9, Wave 11, and Wave 14, which were collected between 1992 and 20058.  In 
these survey waves, which are the ones that provide detailed information on 
bereavement, the BHPS asks randomly selected adult individuals the same question 
about important events that happened to them or their family members in the last year:  
 
Survey question: 
 
“Would you please tell me anything that has happened to you (or your family) which 
has stood out as important? This might be things you've done, or things that have 
been of interest or concern; just whatever comes to mind as important to you.  Also 
state whether the event happened to you, one of your family member, or someone else 
from outside the household.”   
 
This is asked as an open-ended question, so the answers could be anything from ill 
health to getting a job promotion.  Around 6% of the sample answered “death” as one 
of the major events that took place in the previous year.  Respondents were also asked 
to state whose death it was.  The answers to this question ranged from “child” to 
“friend”.  These are the data used in the paper. 
 
As far as we are aware, the only other paper on well-being to use these responses 
from BHPS -- that is, the open-ended questions -- is innovative work by Ballas and 
Dorling (2007).  Their methods and main purpose are different from ours and the 
respective projects began independently.  Nevertheless, although the authors are not 
concerned with the calculation of emotional damages, Ballas and Dorling (2007) do 
note some negative effects from the death variables (using a form of mental well-
being equation, namely one based on a sub-question from the twelve on the GHQ list 
of questions), and their first draft slightly pre-dated our own.  More broadly, it is 
known in the happiness literature that spousal bereavement has large negative 
consequences: see for instance Diener et al (1999), Easterlin (2003) and Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2004).  To the best of our knowledge, the published regression-equation 
happiness literature has not examined the influence of child death and other 
                                                 
8The wave 2 data were collected between late 1991 and early 1992.  The wave 3 data were collected between late 
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bereavements of this kind.  There is, however, a relevant psychiatric literature, such as 
Li et al (2005).  There is also some evidence that marital well-being falls after the 
death of a child in the family: Broman et al (1996). 
 
The analysis will use two measures of mental well-being.  One is a psychological 
distress score (from 0 to 12).  The other is a life-satisfaction score (from 1 to 7). 
 
The BHPS contains a mental health measure, a General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
score.  This has been used internationally by medical researchers and other 
investigators as an indicator of psychological strain or stress.  Recent applications of 
GHQ include Cardozo et al (2000), Clark and Oswald (1994, 2002), Martikainen et al 
(2003), Pevalin and Ermisch (2004), Robinson et al (2004), and Shields and Wheatley 
Price (2005).   
 
A GHQ score is one of the most commonly adopted questionnaire-based methods of 
assessing psychological well-being.  It amalgamates answers to the following list of 
twelve questions: 
Have you recently: 
1. Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
2. Lost much sleep over worry? 
3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
4. Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
5. Felt constantly under strain? 
6. Felt you could not overcome your difficulties? 
7. Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
8. Been able to face up to your problems? 
9. Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
10. Been losing confidence in yourself? 
11. Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
12. Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1993 and early 1994, and so on. 
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Responses are made on a four-point scale of frequency of feeling in relation to a 
person's usual state: they are "Not at all", "No more than usual", "Rather more than 
usual", and "Much more than usual".  
 
As a measure of mental strain, the paper takes a simple summation.  It is coded here 
so people answer with respect to usual and the responses with the two lowest well-
being values score 1 and those with the two higher well-being value scores 0.  Put 
exactly, this is the BHPS variable HLGHQ2: it converts valid answers to questions 
wGHQA to wGHQL to a single scale by recoding 1 and 2 values on individual 
variables to 0, and 3 and 4 values to 1, giving a scale running from 0 (the least 
distressed) to 12 (the most distressed).  Medical opinion is that normal individuals 
score around 1 or 2 on the GHQ measure.  Numbers near 12 are rare and correspond 
to clinical depression.  For reasons not fully understood, GHQ scores are trending 
slightly up through time in Britain (Oswald and Powdthavee 2007), and we adjust for 
that in the later analysis. 
 
In some cases the paper uses as an alternative a life satisfaction question.  This form 
has been widely used in the happiness literature.  The wording in the BHPS survey is: 
 
“All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life overall 
using a 1-7 scale?” 
 
Results 
 
The data set provides information on more than 2000 bereavements.  Table 1 
summarizes the occurrence of the different deaths in the data. 
 
As might be anticipated, the death of a loved one has psychological consequences.  
Figure 1 charts the before-and-after mental distress levels, on a 0 to 12 GHQ scale, of 
those who suffer the death of a child, a spousal partner, or a parent9.  The two time 
periods depicted are for the year before the person died and the year of bereavement 
(so these individuals reported that there had been a death in the 12 months since they 
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were last interviewed).  Figure 1 is for 1992 to 1995 alone, because this period gives 
us consecutive observations on bereavements.  The Figure covers those in BHPS who 
lost a loved one in any of those years in the data set.  As would be expected, child 
deaths are relatively unusual.   
 
Bereavement is painful.  Figure 1 shows that psychological distress (i.e. GHQ-12) is 
initially around 1.3 among those who will lose a child, and slightly below 3 among 
those who go on to lose a partner in the next year.  Mental distress then rises abruptly 
to 3.5 in the actual year that the person reports having had a child die, and to 6.3 if the 
person lost a spousal partner.  A smaller rise is discernible among those who had a 
parent die.  Ideally we would exploit data on the circumstances of the bereavement, 
including to what extent it was a premature death, but that information is not available 
in the BHPS data set.  
 
To allow the extent of any hedonic adaptation to be explored, Figures 2 and 3 extend 
the graphs for a further year.  These also broaden the categories of bereavement.  
They plot separately the mean psychological distress scores of those in the sample 
who either lost a mother (N = 120), father (N = 119), a sibling (N = 80), or a friend (N 
= 114).  As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, there is evidence of a rise in the mean 
levels of psychological distress after all types of death.  For example, the mean level 
of individual GHQ mental strain is 2.5 in the year before losing a father.  In the actual 
year of their father’s death, a person’s psychological distress increases to 
approximately 3.2.  One year later, however, psychological distress has fallen again to 
around 2.5.  Similar patterns of apparent hedonic adaptation are seen for other types 
of death.  For spousal bereavement, these graphs reinforce the earlier results of Clark 
et al (2004), Easterlin (2003), and Gardner and Oswald (2006).  Other types of death 
have not, to our knowledge, been systematically studied (though, as explained, Ballas 
and Dorling is in part a counter-example). 
 
We now turn to regression equations. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
9 For simplicity, we only used wave 2 to wave 5 (and so ignore the discontinued waves, i.e. waves 9, 11, and 14) 
in our longitudinal plots of psychological distress for those who lost someone to death.    
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Table 2 presents cross-section life satisfaction equations.  We treat bereavement as 
exogenous (partly because it seems reasonable to do so, and partly because it is 
difficult to know how to instrument for others’ deaths).  Assuming cardinality in the 
7-point-scale life satisfaction scores (1 = very dissatisfied, …, 7 = very satisfied), the 
first column includes deaths as the only independent variables in the least squares 
regression.  The econometric analysis is restricted to those of working age (that is, of 
ages16-65).  This is to reduce the risk of, say, anticipated natural death of children and 
parents.   
 
The coefficient on death of father is -0.249 in the first column of Table 2, which 
implies that the bereavement loss is approximately a quarter of a life satisfaction 
point.  Its robust standard error is 0.106, so the null of zero can be rejected at the 5% 
level.  The coefficients on death of mother and spousal partner are -0.268 and -0.894, 
respectively.  Both coefficients are statistically well-determined at the 5% level.  On 
the other hand, in column 1 of Table 2 the coefficients on death of a child, sibling, and 
friend are not statistically significantly different from zero.  It should be noted, 
nevertheless, that the coefficient on child-death in the first column of Table 2 is large 
in an absolute sense at -0.395.  Later in the paper, in larger samples, this effect 
becomes statistically significant. 
 
Column 2 of Table 2 increases the number of independent variables.  It controls for 
gender, age, age-squared, household income per capita (in £10,000), marital status, 
employment status, education, household size, number of children at different ages, 
and homeownership status.  The R-squared values remain modest, at less than 10% of 
the variance explained, which suggests that much remains to be discovered, perhaps 
about the role of (here unobservable) personalities.  Income is deflated by the 
consumer price index.  All £ values in the paper are real, and expressed in 1996-
pounds10.  Compared to column 1, the coefficients in column 2 of Table 2 on the 
death-of-a-mother and death-of-a-father variables decline a little in size, whilst there 
is a slightly bigger drop in the coefficient size on death of partner from -0.894 to -
0.670.   
 
                                                 
10 Currently, £1 = approximately $2.   
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In column 2 of Table 2, the coefficient on real household income is 0.105, with a 
statistically well-determined effect (its standard error is 0.015).  This makes it 
possible to work out how much income would be required to offset the distress from 
an event such as bereavement.  To compensate for the loss of a mother, the necessary 
sum here = £20,000 per annum.  To compensate for a loss of partner = £64,000 per 
annum.  To compensate for the loss of a child = £41,000 per annum. 
 
A difficulty here is that income may be endogenous.  In column 3 of Table 2, we 
instrument income by income measured at t-1.  The IV coefficient on income is 0.163, 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Here, to compensate for a loss of 
mother = £10,000 per annum.  To compensate for a loss of partner = £36,000 per 
annum.  To compensate for a loss of a child = £34,000 per annum.  These numbers are 
smaller than before because the estimated marginal effect of income has increased.  
However, lagged income is arguably not ideal as an instrumental variable, and later in 
the paper we consider alternatives. 
 
The last column of Table 2 includes instead a measure of average income over time 
within the life satisfaction regression.  The average income over time represents a 
more permanent measure of household income.  The coefficient on average income 
over time is 0.202, with a standard error of 0.023.  Using this coefficient, we need 
approximately £10,000 per annum to compensate for a loss of mother; £32,000 per 
annum to compensate for a loss of partner; £21,000 per annum for a child. 
 
Life satisfaction data are collected in the BHPS in Wave 7 and intermittently 
afterwards.  On this measure of well-being, does bereavement have a long-lasting 
effect?  Table 3 estimates life satisfaction equations as a function of events that 
happened long before.  In particular, the logic of Table 3 is to see whether, controlling 
for deaths in the immediate period, there is any scarring effect on those who had 
experienced death prior to wave 7.  Mostly such scarring seems to disappear (although 
some small negative effects can be seen, insignificantly different from zero).  There 
are two exceptions: long-dead friends carry a long-term happiness penalty; a long-
dead child carries a small long-term happiness gain.  We do not feel qualified to 
speculate on psychological explanations for these patterns. 
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Using data on GHQ psychological distress, Table 4 explores the consequences of the 
death of loved ones upon a different measure of well-being.  Estimation of GHQ 
equations goes back to the ordered estimators of Clark and Oswald (1994), and our 
equation form is similar in structure, but they did not have controls for deaths of 
different loved ones.  The dependent variable here is GHQ-12 measured cardinally 
(where 12 = worst possible psychological well-being).   
 
Table 4 has a larger sample than the previous regression tables.  In column 1 of Table 
4, only death variables are included in the psychological distress equation.  Now, all 
the death dummies enter the distress equation with positive and statistically 
significant coefficients.  The largest effect comes from death of partner, with a 
coefficient size of 3.498 and a standard error of 0.406.  Next is the effect of a child’s 
death; the coefficient is 2.074, with a standard error of 0.552. The smallest effect on 
psychological distress comes from death of sibling; the coefficient is 0.562 and the 
standard error 0.209.   
 
Column 2 of Table 4 moves on to a full specification.  Most coefficients on death are 
relatively little-changed.  The coefficient on income is -0.151, with a standard error of 
0.022.  Ordinary least squares estimates imply the following: To compensate for death 
of father = £78,000 per annum; death of mother = £61,000 per annum; death of 
partner = £206,000 per annum; death of a sibling = £32,000 per annum; death of a 
child = £137,000 per annum; death of a friend = £51,000 per annum.   
 
Column 3 estimates an individual random effects model of psychological distress that 
includes death variables as the independent variables. The coefficient on income is -
0.099, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  To compensate for death of 
father = £101,000 per annum; death of mother = £87,000 per annum; death of partner 
= £286,000 per annum; death of a sibling = £39,000 per annum; death of child = 
£221,000 per annum; death of friend = £55,000 per annum.  Column 4 of Table 4 
presents IV-RE estimates, using income at t-1 to instrument for the current real 
income.  The coefficient of income is -0.171, with a standard error of 0.035.  Now to 
compensate for death of father = £55,000 per annum; death of mother = £59,000 per 
annum; death of partner = £172,000 per annum; death of a sibling = £20,000 per 
annum; death of child = £141,000 per annum; death of friend = £38,000 per annum.   
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Column 5 includes mean income over time (i.e. permanent income) into an RE 
regression.  The coefficient on mean income over time is -0.247, with a standard error 
of 0.032.  To compensate for death of father = £40,000 per annum; death of mother = 
£35,000 per annum; death of partner = £115,000 per annum; death of a sibling = 
£16,000 per annum; death of child = £89,000 per annum; death of friend = £22,000 
per annum.     
 
Column 6 of Table 4 reports fixed effects estimates.  These can allow for genetic and 
unchanging personality variables.  Most of the coefficients on death variables remain 
similar in size.  For example, the coefficient on death of mother is 0.861 in RE and 
0.877 in FE; the coefficient on death of partner is 2.834 in RE and 2.752 in FE.  
However, income’s coefficient is not very precisely determined. 
 
Some readers of earlier drafts of this paper -- we thank especially George 
Loewenstein -- were concerned about the possibility that bereavement and income 
might not appear in a separable way in a well-being equation.  This is an important 
issue.  If the marginal utility of income is affected by undergoing the loss of a loved 
one, the calculations done above are incorrect (or at least incomplete).  We spent 
some time examining different functional forms.  However, we could not find strong 
evidence for the idea that bereaved people have a different marginal utility of income.  
Appendix A sets out one illustrative test that shows it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that all interaction terms have coefficients of zero.  Could this merely be 
for the reason that such tests lack power because of relatively small sample sizes on 
bereavements?  Our experiments suggested not.  For instance, when equations were 
estimated for the sub-sample of people who had suffered bereavement, the point 
estimate of their marginal utility of income was similar to that for the much larger 
sub-sample of people who did not experience bereavement.  Thus it does not appear 
that there are problems caused by a low-power test.  Instead, the data suggest it is 
reasonable simplification to assume that well-being can be written as an additively 
separable linear equation.    
 
Table 5 presents fixed-effects estimates for each gender.   
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Men suffer a significantly smaller blow from deaths than women (with the exception 
of losing a partner, which seems to have a symmetrical impact on psychological 
distress on both men and women).  This is consistent with some medical evidence that 
hospitalization rates for mental illness are higher, after child death, among women: Li 
et al (2005).  When a father dies, for example, women here experience on average a 
worsening of 1.127 GHQ points; men experience a worsening by 0.534 points.  The 
death of a child raises a woman’s psychological distress by 2.169 GHQ points.  A 
man’s is raised by 1.315 points.  Income’s coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero in these Table 5 FE equations, however.     
 
It should be noted that, with the exception of the male-female divide, this paper has 
not greatly explored the case of disaggregated valuation of bereavement losses.  
Following the ideas of Sunstein (2004), there seems scope for a fuller analysis.  Smith 
et al (2005) conclude that wealth buffers the size of the drop in happiness caused by a 
decline in health; it is possible that richer people are affected less by bereavement 
shocks, but Appendix A does not find empirical support for that. 
 
The sizes of possible payments for emotional damages are documented, in summary 
form, in Table 6. 
 
A potential weakness of most of the regression equations estimated above is that 
income is arguably endogenously determined.  This raises the standard identification 
problem: if happiness depends on income, and income is itself a function of 
happiness, then the parameter estimates are biased and inconsistent.  To solve this, a 
valid instrument for income is needed.  The use of lagged income is open to 
objections.  Here we draw upon two instruments not used before.  First, the British 
Household Panel Survey asks their interviewers to try to see the actual payslip of the 
survey respondent.  Where this is achieved, the information about income is likely to 
be more accurate.  However, there is no reason to expect happiness itself to be 
affected by whether or not the interviewer sees the payslip.  Hence we use this -- a 
dummy variable for the observation of the payslip -- as an instrument for income.   
Second, although income in the paper is deflated by a consumer price index, there is 
information in Britain on regional house prices.  We employ this variable, lagged at t-
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1, as a further instrument for income; one rationale is that high house prices 
eventually act to raise wages in a region.   
 
We found that instrumented personal income then works strongly in a well-being 
equation.  Appendix B gives the details.  It shows that both instrumental variables 
enter positively, with well-determined standard errors, in a log-of-personal-income 
equation.  An over-identification test suggests that the instruments are valid.  
 
Table 7 thus reports both life-satisfaction and mental-distress regression equations in 
which the log level of real personal income is treated as an endogenous independent 
variable.  The coefficients on the death variables are approximately as before.  
However, these instrumented estimates -- particularly in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 
7 -- produce much better-defined coefficients on income.  Moreover, instrumenting 
income increases the size of the estimated effect, by between 5-fold and 10-fold.  In 
the life-satisfaction equations in Table 7, for example, the coefficient on log income 
rises between columns 1 and 2 from 0.091 to 0.698.  In the fixed-effects GHQ distress 
equations, instrumenting the income variable produces in column 6 a coefficient of -
0.818 with a standard error of 0.144.  By contrast, without the instrumenting the 
income coefficient is small.  This suggests that the bias under OLS is negative: happy 
people may work less hard to earn income so that, in simple correlations, where no 
correction for simultaneity is done, this can produce the illusion that money does not 
buy much happiness. 
 
Calculating the size of necessary hedonic compensation per-annum amounts once 
again, gives, in this case using the GHQ equations from Table 7, for the average 
individual a set of amounts listed in Table 8.  Despite the change in detailed method 
in Table 7, these numbers are not too different from those earlier in the paper. 
 
Because the paper’s aim is principally to lay out a method of analysis, we shall not 
here attempt to adjudicate between the compensation amounts calculated under 
different econometric specifications.  Many economists, however, would be likely to 
put most reliance on equations in which person fixed-effects were accounted for, and 
in which the income variable was instrumented.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies a class of extreme negative shocks to utility -- how people are 
affected by different kinds of deaths, and especially the death of a spouse, a child, and 
a parent.  We are conscious that this is a complex, emotive area.   
 
By estimating mental well-being equations, in a way that averages across the 
individuals in our sample, the paper draws five conclusions. 
 
First, bereavement causes substantial mental distress.  The rank order of emotional 
severity is (starting with the greatest): death of a spouse; death of a child; death of a 
parent.  Second, our data suggest that, in response to bereavement, women suffer 
larger falls in happiness than men.  The death of a child, for example, here worsens 
women’s mental well-being by 2.2 GHQ points, compared to 1.3 points for men.11  
Third, we find signs of hedonic adaptation to six kinds of bereavement (spouse; child; 
mother; father; sibling; friend).  Because of gaps in the collection of the deaths data, 
however, we lack a large enough number of consecutive years to allow us to study 
adaptation in a systematic way.  This is an important arena for further inquiry.  
Fourth, the paper suggests that happiness equations could be used in a tort setting to 
calculate emotional damages12.  Some illustrative compensation amounts are given.  
Using GHQ mental distress as the measure of well-being, the hedonic compensation 
annual amount in the first year for the death of a child might be of the order of 
£100,000 ($200,000).  However, in our judgement more research is needed, on other 
countries and data sets, before courts could implement such methods.  The paper’s 
contribution is methodological; we believe these ideas should, for the time being, be 
treated cautiously.  Fifth, instrumenting the income variable raises its coefficient in 
well-being regression equations.  This issue is of more than technical interest.  The 
                                                 
11 These are large effects from bereavement -- approximately equal in size to one standard-deviation in measured 
well-being.  They lie on a GHQ distress scale where the mean is approximately 2 and the range of possible 
psychological well-being levels is between zero and 12 points.    
12 The paper does not attempt to contribute to ideas on deterrence, and, with some justification, a referee has 
criticized us for that.  Issues of deterrence certainly matter, although Sunstein et al (2000) raises interesting 
difficulties with whether human beings actually want efficient deterrence.  How deterrence and restitutio in 
integrum ought to interact -- as discussed by Ireland (2001) -- remains incompletely understood.  It is likely that 
future work will have to tackle this.   
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size of the parameter has a fundamental bearing on the appropriate level of 
compensation for hedonic harm. 
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Table 1: Data on Deaths of Loved Ones in the British Household Panel  
Study Between 1992 and 2005 
 
 
  
For GHQ-12 
analysis 
For life satisfaction 
analysis 
Death n 
% of 
sample n 
% of 
sample 
     
Child 120 0.14 49 0.17 
Partner 278 0.32 89 0.31 
Father 521 0.60 148 0.52 
Mother 700 0.81 300 1.06 
Sibling 430 0.50 161 0.57 
Friend 455 0.53 139 0.49 
          
N 86,623 28,418 
 
Note: The figures are taken from people answering ‘death’ in the life events question: “Would 
you please tell me anything that has happened to you (or your family) in the previous year 
which has stood out as important? This might be things you've done, or things that have been 
of interest or concern; just whatever comes to mind as important to you.”  The question was 
asked only intermittently.  The GHQ mental distress questions were asked in every year of the 
sample.  The life satisfaction question was first introduced in wave 6 of the BHPS. It was then 
dropped for wave 11, but reintroduced again for wave 12.  This limits what can be done in 
any consecutive-year analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Means and standard deviations in the later analysis: 
 
Mean of life satisfaction = 5.23  
(SD = 1.31 (overall), 0.78 (within)). 
 
Mean of GHQ-12 psychological distress = 1.90  
(SD = 2.94 (overall), 2.11 (within)). 
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 Table 2: Life-Satisfaction Regression Equations with Death Variables 
 
  OLS OLS IV OLS 
Life event     
Death father -0.249** -0.157 -0.182 -0.170 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.127) (0.105) 
Death mother -0.268*** -0.214*** -0.163* -0.213*** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.084) (0.078) 
Death partner -0.894*** -0.670*** -0.590** -0.661*** 
 (0.242) (0.250) (0.275) (0.251) 
Death sibling 0.014 -0.051 0.117 -0.047 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) 
Death child -0.395 -0.430* -0.556* -0.430* 
 (0.245) (0.242) (0.287) (0.240) 
Death friend 0.096 0.090 0.131 0.110 
 (0.119) (0.116) (0.130) (0.115) 
     
Personal & household characteristics    
Male  -0.046** -0.046** -0.051*** 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
Age  -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.070*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age-sq/100  0.075*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Real household income per capita (£10k)  0.105*** 0.163*** 0.004 
  (0.015) (0.033) (0.015) 
Mean income over time    0.202*** 
    (0.023) 
Living as couple  -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.151*** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) 
Widowed  -0.497*** -0.426*** -0.474*** 
  (0.077) (0.082) (0.077) 
Divorced  -0.664*** -0.593*** -0.642*** 
  (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) 
Separated  -0.814*** -0.787*** -0.789*** 
  (0.070) (0.082) (0.071) 
Single  -0.454*** -0.437*** -0.452*** 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) 
Unemployed  -0.447*** -0.410*** -0.424*** 
  (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) 
Retired  0.030 0.023 0.023 
  (0.047) (0.052) (0.047) 
Family care  -0.123*** -0.104** -0.107*** 
  (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) 
Student  0.084** 0.114** 0.074* 
  (0.042) (0.053) (0.042) 
Education: A-level  0.077*** 0.067** 0.071** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) 
Education: University  0.091*** 0.072** 0.069** 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) 
Household size  0.013 0.013 0.021** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Number of children (age 0-2)  0.030 0.063* 0.019 
  (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) 
Number of children (age 3-4)  0.031 0.071** 0.025 
  (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) 
Number of children (age 5-11)  -0.033* -0.004 -0.025 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
Number of children (age 12-15)  -0.049** -0.052** -0.037* 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) 
Number of children (age 16-18)  -0.047 -0.068 -0.046 
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  (0.038) (0.046) (0.038) 
Home ownership  0.183*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
Constant 5.164*** 6.475*** 6.528*** 6.418*** 
 (0.010) (0.125) (0.146) (0.126) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.002 0.059 0.052 0.063 
N 23417 22927 18113 22927 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001     
 
 
Note: Here the data are taken from waves 9, 11, and 14.  The 7-point-scale life-satisfaction question was 
asked first in Wave 7 (that is, in 1997), with 1 = very dissatisfied with life, and 7 = very satisfied with life. 
OLS stands for ordinary least squares; IV is instrumental variables.  Here the instrument for income is 
lagged income. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
A dummy variable such as “Death father” means that the interviewee’s father died during the 12 month 
period prior to interview. 
 
The income variable, here and in later tables, is real income.  It has been deflated by the consumer 
price index (CPI).   
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Table 3: Life-Satisfaction Regression Equations with Death and  
Deaths Long Ago (Before Wave 7 of the Panel)  
 
  OLS 
  
Death father -0.175* 
 (0.105) 
Death mother -0.209*** 
 (0.078) 
Death partner -0.660*** 
 (0.251) 
Death sibling -0.051 
 (0.167) 
Death child -0.432* 
 (0.240) 
Death friend 0.106 
 (0.115) 
Previously had death of child 0.385** 
 (0.167) 
Previously had death of partner -0.181 
 (0.241) 
Previously had death of dad -0.013 
 (0.069) 
Previously had death of mum 0.056 
 (0.075) 
Previously had death of friend -0.293*** 
 (0.094) 
Previously had death of sibling 0.063 
 (0.134) 
Real household income per capita (£10k) 0.004 
 (0.015) 
Mean income over time 0.202*** 
 (0.023) 
Constant 6.411*** 
 (0.126) 
  
Other personal and household characteristics Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
R-sq 0.0636 
N 22927 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
Note: Here the data are taken from waves 9, 11, and 14.  The “Previously had…” death variables go 
back to events up to twelve years earlier.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 4: Psychological-Distress Regression Equations with Death Variables  
 
  OLS OLS RE IV-RE RE FE 
       
Life event       
Death father 1.259*** 1.172*** 0.998*** 0.940*** 0.998*** 0.877*** 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.117) (0.130) (0.117) (0.127) 
Death mother 1.001*** 0.928*** 0.858*** 1.008*** 0.861*** 0.877*** 
 (0.139) (0.137) (0.105) (0.116) (0.105) (0.115) 
Death partner 3.498*** 3.115*** 2.835*** 2.936*** 2.834*** 2.752*** 
 (0.406) (0.409) (0.273) (0.317) (0.273) (0.306) 
Death sibling 0.562*** 0.486** 0.386** 0.336* 0.385** 0.279 
 (0.209) (0.207) (0.183) (0.199) (0.183) (0.204) 
Death child 2.074*** 2.074*** 2.193*** 2.413*** 2.201*** 2.422*** 
 (0.552) (0.547) (0.330) (0.372) (0.330) (0.358) 
Death friend 0.802*** 0.776*** 0.544*** 0.646*** 0.537*** 0.422*** 
 (0.196) (0.194) (0.146) (0.161) (0.146) (0.157) 
       
Personal & household characteristics      
Male  -0.497*** -0.508*** -0.522*** -0.501***  
  (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033)  
Age  0.078*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.076***  
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)  
Age-sq/100  -0.091*** -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.063*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) 
Real household income per capita (£10k)  -0.151*** -0.099*** -0.171*** -0.020 -0.012 
  (0.022) (0.017) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) 
Mean income over time     -0.247***  
     (0.032)  
Living as couple  0.162*** 0.104** 0.077 0.106** -0.039 
  (0.049) (0.043) (0.048) (0.043) (0.062) 
Widowed  0.590*** 0.701*** 0.609*** 0.680*** 0.754*** 
  (0.133) (0.102) (0.112) (0.102) (0.168) 
Divorced  0.673*** 0.514*** 0.427*** 0.494*** -0.014 
  (0.086) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.093) 
Separated  1.372*** 1.326*** 1.346*** 1.302*** 1.097*** 
  (0.125) (0.084) (0.094) (0.084) (0.107) 
Single  0.204*** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.190*** 0.114 
  (0.055) (0.047) (0.052) (0.047) (0.080) 
Unemployed  0.884*** 0.855*** 0.835*** 0.828*** 0.768*** 
  (0.070) (0.052) (0.059) (0.052) (0.064) 
Retired  -0.039 -0.080 -0.107 -0.077 -0.111 
  (0.071) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.075) 
Family care  0.278*** 0.243*** 0.232*** 0.222*** 0.161*** 
  (0.061) (0.046) (0.051) (0.047) (0.059) 
Student  0.216*** 0.130** -0.007 0.134** -0.043 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.073) (0.058) (0.080) 
Education: A-level  -0.212*** -0.201*** -0.169*** -0.183*** 0.083 
  (0.047) (0.040) (0.045) (0.040) (0.110) 
Education: University  -0.151*** -0.197*** -0.176*** -0.155*** 0.027 
  (0.048) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.103) 
Household size  -0.049*** -0.024* -0.029* -0.031** 0.014 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) 
Number of children (age 0-2)  0.054 0.054 0.044 0.055 0.065 
  (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) (0.040) (0.048) 
Number of children (age 3-4)  -0.036 -0.035 -0.061 -0.040 -0.058 
  (0.044) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.047) 
Number of children (age 5-11)  -0.036 -0.078*** -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.128*** 
  (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.030) 
Number of children (age 12-15)  0.076** 0.046* 0.060* 0.040 0.010 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.034) 
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Number of children (age 16-18)  -0.058 -0.040 -0.022 -0.044 -0.019 
  (0.059) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.062) 
Home ownership  -0.261*** -0.214*** -0.220*** -0.205*** -0.085 
  (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.053) 
Constant 1.895*** 0.874*** 1.056*** 1.076*** 1.127*** 2.534*** 
 (0.017) (0.199) (0.180) (0.204) (0.180) (0.211) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.005 0.035     
R-sq (within)   0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015 
N 66673 66194 66194 55735 66194 66194 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Note: These are GHQ equations.  Here the data are taken from waves 2-5, 9, 11, and 14.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. RE stands for random effects; FE for fixed effects.  The instrument here is lagged 
income.   
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Table 5: Psychological-Distress Regression Equations with Different Death 
Variables: Female and Male Sub-samples 
 
  Women Men 
   
Life event   
Death father 1.127*** 0.534*** 
 (0.166) (0.180) 
Death mother 1.251*** 0.380** 
 (0.151) (0.148) 
Death partner 2.743*** 2.188*** 
 (0.230) (0.287) 
Death sibling 0.476** -0.178 
 (0.189) (0.210) 
Death child 2.169*** 1.315*** 
 (0.342) (0.436) 
Death friend 0.513*** 0.091 
 (0.175) (0.190) 
   
Personal & household characteristics  
Age-sq/100 0.034*** 0.023* 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Real household income per capita (£10k) 0.009 -0.036 
 (0.029) (0.026) 
Living as couple 0.038 -0.213*** 
 (0.086) (0.079) 
Widowed 0.625*** 0.328** 
 (0.125) (0.162) 
Divorced 0.084 -0.047 
 (0.115) (0.131) 
Separated 1.097*** 1.063*** 
 (0.136) (0.152) 
Single 0.065 -0.051 
 (0.113) (0.101) 
Unemployed 0.838*** 0.687*** 
 (0.103) (0.072) 
Retired 0.009 -0.248*** 
 (0.077) (0.079) 
Family care 0.148** 0.079 
 (0.061) (0.248) 
Student 0.165 -0.094 
 (0.110) (0.105) 
Education: A-level 0.022 0.036 
 (0.150) (0.144) 
Education: University 0.101 0.049 
 (0.143) (0.133) 
Household size 0.019 0.028 
 (0.027) (0.024) 
Number of children (age 0-2) 0.114* 0.017 
 (0.067) (0.062) 
Number of children (age 3-4) 0.018 -0.084 
 (0.064) (0.061) 
Number of children (age 5-11) 0.125*** -0.083** 
 (0.040) (0.039) 
Number of children (age 12-15) 0.066 -0.006 
 (0.046) (0.044) 
Number of children (age 16-18) 0.096 0.081 
 (0.086) (0.082) 
Home ownership 0.093 -0.169*** 
 (0.068) (0.061) 
Constant 0.972** 0.954*** 
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 (0.392) (0.368) 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R-sq (within) 0.019 0.012 
N 43258 36374 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
 
Note: These are GHQ equations.  Here the data are taken from waves 2-5, 9, 11, and 14.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: 
 
Illustrative Valuations of Compensatory Damages (in the first year) 
These are taken from Columns 3 and 5 (RE results) of Table 4. 
 
Death amount per annum 
GHQ-12 equation   
  
Partner £114k-£202k 
Child £89k-£140k 
Father £40k-£101k 
Mother £35k-£61k 
Friend £22k-£51k 
Sibling £16k-£32k 
    
 
Note: £114k stands for 114,000 per annum UK pounds sterling. At the time of writing, the exchange rate is 
approximately $2 to £1. 
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Table 7: Well-being Regression Equations with Death Variables and Personal 
Income: Further Instrumented Estimates 
 
         Life satisfaction               Psychological distress (GHQ-12) 
  OLS IV RE RE-IV FE FE-IV 
       
Life event       
Death father -0.145 -0.108 1.018*** 1.016*** 0.892*** 0.935*** 
 (0.190) (0.213) (0.118) (0.156) (0.128) (0.162) 
Death mother -0.338** -0.168 0.888*** 1.025*** 0.903*** 0.964*** 
 (0.165) (0.174) (0.107) (0.137) (0.116) (0.144) 
Death partner -0.809 -1.642* 2.829*** 2.910*** 2.748*** 2.839*** 
 (0.537) (0.856) (0.273) (0.361) (0.308) (0.387) 
Death sibling -0.218 -0.133 0.407** 0.086 0.313 0.093 
 (0.375) (0.453) (0.187) (0.237) (0.208) (0.251) 
Death child -0.130 -0.208 2.228*** 2.240*** 2.441*** 2.137*** 
 (0.242) (0.328) (0.333) (0.422) (0.361) (0.447) 
Death friend 0.042 0.305** 0.544*** 0.658*** 0.411*** 0.464** 
 (0.252) (0.151) (0.148) (0.184) (0.159) (0.192) 
       
Personal & household characteristics      
Male -0.112*** -0.385*** -0.504*** 0.000   
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.034) (0.062)   
Age -0.094*** -0.143*** 0.065*** 0.180*** 0.054 0.134** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.045) (0.062) 
Age-sq/100 0.106*** 0.161*** -0.077*** -0.212*** -0.064*** -0.193*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) 
Log of real personal income 0.091*** 0.698*** -0.017 -1.159*** 0.018 -0.818*** 
 (0.020) (0.097) (0.013) (0.092) (0.017) (0.144) 
Living as couple -0.142*** -0.280*** 0.090** 0.141** -0.048 -0.005 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.044) (0.055) (0.062) (0.078) 
Widowed -0.780*** -0.771*** 0.693*** 1.029*** 0.702*** 1.018*** 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.103) (0.137) (0.171) (0.220) 
Divorced -0.770*** -0.782*** 0.528*** 0.565*** -0.013 0.143 
 (0.077) (0.081) (0.061) (0.076) (0.093) (0.117) 
Separated -0.695*** -0.810*** 1.339*** 1.597*** 1.091*** 1.472*** 
 (0.095) (0.116) (0.085) (0.112) (0.107) (0.136) 
Single -0.603*** -0.548*** 0.178*** 0.074 0.109 0.142 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.048) (0.062) (0.082) (0.101) 
Unemployed -0.540*** -0.163 0.889*** 0.098 0.773*** 0.341*** 
 (0.099) (0.154) (0.054) (0.092) (0.066) (0.104) 
Retired -0.006 0.246** -0.074 -0.540*** -0.102 -0.444*** 
 (0.087) (0.096) (0.061) (0.083) (0.077) (0.107) 
Family care -0.122 0.611*** 0.258*** -0.958*** 0.174*** -0.593*** 
 (0.074) (0.143) (0.049) (0.110) (0.062) (0.136) 
Student 0.167* 0.926*** 0.166*** -1.214*** -0.004 -0.876*** 
 (0.090) (0.166) (0.064) (0.135) (0.087) (0.176) 
Education: A-level 0.306*** 0.241*** -0.211*** -0.025 0.118 0.176 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.041) (0.055) (0.112) (0.139) 
Education: University 0.348*** 0.085 -0.227*** 0.208*** 0.039 0.102 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.042) (0.063) (0.105) (0.130) 
Household size 0.003 0.023 -0.018 -0.077*** 0.014 -0.314*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.064) 
Number of children (age 0-2) 0.079 -0.062 0.080** 0.191*** 0.070 0.120** 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.040) (0.053) (0.048) (0.060) 
Number of children (age 3-4) -0.014 -0.020 -0.011 0.002 -0.054 -0.103* 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.040) (0.051) (0.047) (0.058) 
Number of children (age 5-11) -0.076** -0.112*** -0.056** -0.005 -0.126*** -0.087** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
Number of children (age 12-15) -0.051 -0.074* 0.066** 0.152*** 0.013 0.046 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.043) 
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Number of children (age 16-18) -0.064 -0.157 -0.035 0.012 -0.023 -0.013 
 (0.079) (0.096) (0.055) (0.069) (0.064) (0.077) 
Home ownership 0.126** 0.272*** -0.221*** -0.265*** -0.084 -0.116* 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.038) (0.048) (0.054) (0.065) 
Constant 5.955*** 1.509* 1.197*** 8.985*** 0.550  
 (0.269) (0.781) (0.201) (0.677) (1.480)  
       
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 22801 16042 64528 45928 64528 42190 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01       
 
Note: Here the data are taken from waves 9, 11, and 14 for life satisfaction regressions, and include 
waves 2-5 for GHQ psychological distress regressions.  Here income is instrumented with a variable 
for payslip-seen (that is, whether the survey interviewer was shown the person’s actual pay slip) and 
the level of regional house prices.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Further Illustrative Compensation Amounts (in the first year) for 
Different Forms of Bereavement 
 
Implied per-annum compensatory damages in thousands of pounds sterling £ for 
different deaths, under IV random-effects and fixed-effects specifications: 
   
Type of death      RE      FE     
Partner    110k  312k   
Child      59k   126k   
Mother     14k    22k    
Father     14k    21k    
Friend     8k      8k     
Sibling     1k     1k     
 
Notes 
Here the first column is for GHQ random-effects estimates (RE) and the second is for fixed-
effects estimates (FE). These are in thousands of UK £ sterling (at the time of writing, the 
exchange rate is approximately $2 to £1.).  
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Appendix A:  Psychological-Distress Equations with  
the Death Variables Interacted with Income 
 
  OLS RE 
      
Death father 1.277*** 1.166*** 
 (0.313) (0.209) 
Death mother 1.105*** 0.989*** 
 (0.261) (0.191) 
Death partner 3.277*** 3.114*** 
 (0.571) (0.412) 
Death sibling 0.611* 0.202 
 (0.353) (0.331) 
Death child 2.304*** 2.503*** 
 (0.926) (0.554) 
Death friend 0.744*** 0.547*** 
 (0.241) (0.199) 
Real household income per capita (£10k) -0.149*** -0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) 
Death father*household income -0.127 -0.194 
 (0.292) (0.182) 
Death mother*household income -0.176 -0.130 
 (0.216) (0.160) 
Death partner*household income -0.195 -0.333 
 (0.447) (0.364) 
Death sibling*household income -0.176 0.206 
 (0.325) (0.336) 
Death child*household income -0.206 -0.293 
 (0.664) (0.415) 
Death friend*household income 0.030 -0.006 
 (0.107) (0.130) 
   
Personal and household controls Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.035 0.034 
N 66077 66077 
*<0.1, ***<0.01   
 
Note: Here the data are taken from waves 2-5, 9, 11, and 14. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix B:  Income Regression Equations 
(The First-stage Regression of Personal Income -- for Table 7) 
 
  Personal Income Personal Income 
Instrumental variables equations 
used to identify the role of income in 
Table 7 Life Sat IV GHQ RE-IV GHQ FE-IV 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
       
Instruments       
Latest pay slip seen 0.139*** (0.015) 0.115*** (0.011) 0.078*** (0.012) 
Early pay slip seen 0.127*** (0.038) 0.095*** (0.028) 0.078*** (0.030) 
Not applicable -0.436*** (0.025) -0.401*** (0.012) -0.341*** (0.015) 
House price at t-1 0.048*** (0.012) 0.044*** (0.009) 0.043*** (0.012) 
       
Life event       
Death father -0.021 (0.114) -0.011 (0.043) -0.019 (0.044) 
Death mother -0.138* (0.070) -0.069* (0.037) -0.068* (0.038) 
Death partner 0.152 (0.158) -0.041 (0.098) -0.027 (0.104) 
Death sibling -0.130 (0.108) -0.126* (0.064) -0.111* (0.067) 
Death child -0.356** (0.149) -0.211* (0.115) -0.254** (0.119) 
Death friend 0.086 (0.107) 0.086* (0.050) 0.104** (0.051) 
       
Personal & household characteristics      
Male 0.498*** (0.016) 0.518*** (0.012)   
Age 0.087*** (0.005) 0.101*** (0.003) 0.100*** (0.016) 
Age-sq/100 -0.096*** (0.006) -0.115*** (0.004) -0.138*** (0.005) 
Living as couple 0.109*** (0.023) 0.088*** (0.015) 0.063*** (0.021) 
Widowed 0.332*** (0.048) 0.393*** (0.036) 0.530*** (0.055) 
Divorced 0.129*** (0.032) 0.138*** (0.021) 0.237*** (0.030) 
Separated 0.120*** (0.043) 0.140*** (0.030) 0.209*** (0.036) 
Single 0.006 (0.025) -0.052*** (0.017) 0.045* (0.027) 
Unemployed -0.485*** (0.051) -0.350*** (0.021) -0.202*** (0.024) 
Retired -0.092** (0.046) -0.114*** (0.022) -0.148*** (0.026) 
Family care -0.783*** (0.045) -0.687*** (0.019) -0.537*** (0.023) 
Student -1.035*** (0.073) -0.911*** (0.024) -0.768*** (0.031) 
Education: A-level 0.057** (0.023) 0.113*** (0.015) -0.059 (0.037) 
Education: University 0.300*** (0.023) 0.322*** (0.015) -0.003 (0.035) 
Household size -0.079*** (0.010) -0.066*** (0.005) -0.413*** (0.007) 
Number of children (age 0-2) 0.208*** (0.025) 0.123*** (0.014) 0.063*** (0.016) 
Number of children (age 3-4) 0.125*** (0.026) 0.045*** (0.014) -0.028* (0.015) 
Number of children (age 5-11) 0.109*** (0.014) 0.052*** (0.008) 0.033*** (0.010) 
Number of children (age 12-15) 0.083*** (0.019) 0.056*** (0.010) 0.057*** (0.011) 
Number of children (age 16-18) -0.008 (0.038) 0.012 (0.019) 0.018 (0.021) 
Home ownership -0.101*** (0.025) -0.031** (0.013) -0.017 (0.018) 
Constant 7.259*** (0.121) 6.826*** (0.068)   
       
Partial R-sq of excluded instruments 0.045   -   0.021   
F-Test of excluded instruments F(  4, 11408) =   130.59 -  F(  4, 30991) =   168.87 
Over-identification test 2.557 [0.465] -  2.322 [0.465] 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 22801 16042 64528 45928 64528 42190 
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Figure 1: 
 
People’s Levels of GHQ Psychological Distress Before and After  
the Death of a Child, Spousal Partner and Parent 
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Note:  Higher GHQ-12 values here signify worse psychological well-being.  The figure uses a 
subsample of individuals on whom we have strictly consecutive yearly observations.  These data are 
from the years 1992 to 1995; this is because, for this survey question, these are the only consecutive 
years available. The number of bereavements here are: death of child (N=37), death of spousal partner 
(N=59), and death of parent (N=386).  .   
 
The three rises are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  The t-test results are:   
Child: t = -2.905 [p>0.000] 
Partner: t = -6.773 [p>0.000] 
Parent: t= -2.9730 [p>0.000] 
 
These longitudinal graphs depict raw means; they are not regression-corrected. 
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Figure 2: Adaptation after Deaths of Partner and Child: Psychological Distress 
in Three Consecutive Years  
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Note: Here the data are from the years 1992 to 1995.  Higher GHQ-12 values signfiy worse psychological 
well-being.  Year t = year of death.  No death at t-1 and t+1.  There are very small numbers of multiple 
deaths in the sample (i.e. 0.08%).  N of observations:  27 (child) and 59 (partner). 
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Figure 3: Adaptation after Deaths of Mother, Father, Sibling, and  
Friend in Three Consecutive Years 
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Note: Here the data are from the years 1992 to 1995.  Higher GHQ-12 values signify worse 
psychological well-being.  Year t = year of death.  No death at t-1 and t+1.  There are very small 
numbers of multiple deaths in the sample (i.e. 0.08%).  N of observations: 120 (mother), 119 (father), 
80 (sibling), and 114 (friend). 
 
 
